Property, Plant and Equipment disclosure requirements and firm characteristics: the Portuguese Accounting Standardization System by Botelho, Rafaela et al.
 International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences 
Vol. 5, No.1, January 2015, pp. 58–71 
E-ISSN: 2225-8329, P-ISSN: 2308-0337 
© 2015 HRMARS 
www.hrmars.com 
 
 
Property, Plant and Equipment disclosure requirements and firm 
characteristics:  the Portuguese Accounting Standardization System 
 
Rafaela BOTELHO1 
Graça AZEVEDO2 
Alberto COSTA3 
Jonas OLIVEIRA4 
1,2,3,4Higher Institute for Accountancy and Administration, University of Aveiro, Portugal,  
1E-mail: rafaelabotelho@ua.pt, 2E-mail: graca.azevedo@ua.pt,  
3E-mail: alberto.costa@ua.pt, 4E-mail: jonas.oliveira@ua.pt  
 
Abstract In the new Portuguese accounting frame of reference (Portuguese Accounting Standardization System – 
Sistema de Normalização Contabilística), the issues related to Property, Plant and Equipment assets are 
dealt with in the Accounting and Financial Reporting Standard (Norma Contabilística de Relato Financeiro 
– NCRF) 7 (Property, Plant & Equipment). The present study intends to assess the degree of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of this accounting standard by Portuguese unlisted companies. 
Moreover, it tries to identify the factors that influence their level of disclosure. The financial statements 
for 2010 and 2011 were content analyzed and a multiple linear regression model was used to assess the 
motivations for companies to comply with disclosure requirements. Results indicate that older companies 
with lower levels of foreign activity present higher levels of disclosures. The type of auditing firm is also a 
factor that influences the level of compliance with NCRF 7. 
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1. Introduction 
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and Council granted European member 
states the freedom to choose which accounting frame of reference to be applied by companies with no 
securities listed in regulated stock exchange markets: International Accounting Standards/International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS), or other domestic accounting frames of reference. 
In July 2009, Portugal approved the Accounting Standardization System (Sistema de Normalização 
Contabilística – SNC) superseding the previous accounting frame of reference: Portuguese Accounting Plan 
(Plano Oficial de Contabilidade – POC).  
In the SNC, issues related to property, plant and equipment are dealt with in the Accounting and 
Financial Reporting Standard (Norma Contabilística de Relato Financeiro–NCRF) 7 (Property, Plant & 
Equipment). Property, Plant & Equipment (PPE) “increasingly present themselves as a key factor in the 
financial statements of companies due to its capital intensive” (Cunha and Ribeiro, 2008, p. 1).The present 
study focuses on the PPE, basically because the accounting treatments proposed by the SNC are very 
different from those required by the previous POC. The analysis of NCRF7 regarding compliance with its 
disclosure requirements would provide users of financial information with the most comprehensive 
knowledge about them, minimizing errors in their applicability. Therefore, the present study aims to 
analyze the degree of compliance with the disclosures required by NCRF 7, and the factors that influence 
the level of disclosure on PPE. 
Trombetta et al. (2012) highlight the importance of studies of this nature, both for the users of 
financial information and for the proper standardization bodies, as they help to understand the effects of 
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accounting standards. These authors also report that academic studies should be a primary resource for the 
standardization bodies so that they can understand and improve the impact of accounting standards. 
Main findings indicate very interesting levels of compliance with the disclosure requirements of NCRF 
7. The age of the company, the degree of internationalization and the kind of auditing firm are the main 
factors explaining these levels of compliance.  
In the following section, we will contextualize the regulatory setting in Portugal, present the 
literature review, and develop the hypotheses. Thereafter, we will explain our research method, report 
results, and present our conclusions. 
 
2. SNC versus POC: disclosure requirements 
The SNC is based on IAS/IFRS. However, in the previous accounting frame of reference there was the 
possibility to adopt the IAS/IFRS on a supplementary basis. Nevertheless, in terms of Property, Plant and 
Equipment, the SNC’s disclosure requirements are more exhaustive than those required in the POC. The 
main differences between the POC and the SNC are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Property, Plant & Equipment disclosure requirements 
 
SNC POC 
For each class of property, plant & equipment: 
- Measurement bases, depreciation methods, 
useful lives/depreciation rates, gross carrying 
amount and the accumulated depreciation 
(aggregated with accumulated impairment 
losses) at the beginning and end of the period, 
reconciliation of the gross carrying amount at 
the beginning and end of the period; 
 
Restrictions on title and items pledged as 
security for liabilities; 
 
Expenditures to construct property, plant, and 
equipment during the period; 
 
Contractual commitments to acquire property, 
plant, and equipment; 
 
Compensation from third parties for items of 
property, plant, and equipment that were 
impaired, lost or given up that is included in 
profit or loss; 
 
If property, plant, and equipment is stated at 
revalued amounts: 
- the effective date of the revaluation;  
- whether an independent evaluator was 
involved;  
- for each revalued class of property, the 
carrying amount that would have been 
recognised had the assets been carried under 
the cost model;  
- the revaluation surplus, including changes 
during the period and any restrictions on the 
For each class of property, plant & equipment: 
- measurement bases, depreciation methods, 
reconciliation of the gross carrying amount at 
the beginning and end of the period; 
 
If property, plant and equipment is stated at 
revalued amounts: 
- indication of the legal pronouncements that 
have allowed the revaluation of these assets; 
- indication of the methods to deal with 
inflation, in the case of using other techniques 
to revalue the assets; 
- Reconciliation of all items revalued 
considering their gross carrying amounts 
measured at cost and revalued amounts. 
 
For each class of property, plant & equipment: 
- the amount of items in the possession of 
third parties; 
- the amount of items allocated to each 
company’s activities; 
- the amount of items located abroad; 
- the amount of items that are reversal 
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distribution of the balance to shareholders. 
 
3. Literature Review 
There is a vast literature on the economic effects of the transition and implementation process of 
IAS/IFRS in terms of the: a) quantitative impacts of IAS/IFRS adoption (Callao et al., 2007; Lantto & 
Sahlström, 2009; Haller et al., 2009; Callao et al., 2010; Beuren et al., 2008; Iatridis & Rouvolis, 2010);         
b) IAS/IFRS adoption and its value relevance (Daske et al., 2008; Morais & Curto, 2008; Aharony et al., 2010; 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Devalle et al., 2010); conservatism (Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2007; Fifield et al., 2011; 
Liu, 2011); IAS/IFRS adoption and earnings management (Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005; Gassen & 
Sellhorn, 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Jeanjean and 
Stolowy, 2008). 
In terms of the quantitative effects of IAS/IFRS adoption, prior literature has shown that differences 
are due to fair value issues and the recognition of construction contracts, tangible/intangible assets, 
provisions and contingent liabilities/assets, and business combinations (Haller et al., 2009; Lantto & 
Sahlström, 2009). The present study intends to assess the potential impacts of the first adoption of SNC 
(which is based on IAS/IFRS) on the accounting treatment of PPE assets, and to analyze the determinants 
that explain the levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures required by this new accounting frame of 
reference.  
The reasons behind a certain disclosure behavior are complex and a number of theories have been 
developed to explain it, such as, the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the signalling theory (Ross, 
1977; Morris, 1987), the neo-institutional theory (Olivier, 1991; Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 2006), the 
legitimacy theory (Shocker & Sethi, 1974), the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), and the political costs 
theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Birt et al., 2006). 
The agency theory explains how the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers 
can be reduced by the implementation of incentives for managers and mechanisms to monitor their 
attitudes towards risk and to assure the disclosure of information beyond the strictly necessary (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
The signalling theory explains managers’ attitudes to voluntarily disclose more information to the 
market than the one required by regulations, so as to signal their behaviour of best practice as a tactic to 
promote transparency, with the intention of attracting more investment (Ross, 1977; Morris, 1987; 
Christensen, 2002). Consequently, the companies operating in the same industry will be interested in 
disclosing at least the same level of information, because they do not want to be under valuated by the 
market, displaying mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Neo-institutional and legitimacy theories try to explain that this mimetic isomorphism behaviour is a 
way of reducing the transaction costs associated with the information asymmetry, in order to generate 
conformity with institutional and societal pressures and gain legitimacy in society by showing that the 
entity’s actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions (Olivier, 1991; Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006; Deephouse, 1996).  
The stakeholder theory explains the influence of stakeholders on firms’ decisions and, consequently, 
the role of management to achieve the exact level of stakeholder demand. If the level of stakeholder power 
increases, so does the importance of meeting stakeholders demand (Freeman, 1984).  
The political costs theory explains that, to mitigate potential political costs which are politically 
visible, companies increase their disclosures, in order to manipulate their image and divert the attention of 
others (Birt et al., 2006; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Based on information from previous studies on the motivations for corporate disclosures among 
Portuguese companies, we propose the following explanatory variables: company size, leverage, foreign 
activity, profitability, and age (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a, 
2011b). 
 
4. Development of hypotheses 
Company size 
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The agency theory predicts that a larger company is more prone to conflicts between managers and 
investors, implying the existence of agency costs. Thus, managers have more incentives to disclose more 
information so as to reduce agency costs. On the other hand, larger companies are more publicly visible to 
relevant stakeholders, and, therefore, managers are more prone to satisfy the best interests of 
stakeholders by disclosing information, through a legitimation process to manage corporate reputation 
(Oliveira et al., 2011a; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Hackston and Milne (1996) and Oliveira et al. (2006) studied and concluded that this variable is 
positively associated with the amount of disclosure, and, for that reason, larger companies disclose more 
information. Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) found a statistically significant positive association between this 
variable and the level of disclosure. Moreover, Akhtaruddin (2005) and Aljifri (2008) concluded that the 
company size has little impact on the dissemination of information. Finally, Morais and Fialho (2008) and 
Gastón et al. (2010) found no association between firm size and the degree of disclosure. 
Given the diversity of results obtained in the studies mentioned above, the following hypothesis has 
been formulated: 
H1) The number of disclosures on PPE are positively associated with company size. 
 
Leverage 
According to the agency theory, companies highly leveraged have more incentives to disclose 
information in order to reduce their agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, the 
signalling theory indicates that companies with lower levels of leverage have more incentives to signal the 
market with information about their financial structure. 
Previous studies showed that there is no clear relationship between “leverage” and the level of 
disclosure. Archambault and Archambault (2003) and Oliveira et al. (2006) concluded that it does not 
influence the level of disclosure. Adelopo (2011) concluded that this variable has a statistically significant 
negative correlation. Iatridis (2012) concluded that this variable has a positive change, but not statistically 
significant in relation to the degree of disclosure. 
Because of contradictory evidence from previous studies, it is expected that the sign of this variable 
is negative. This assumption has led us to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
H2) The number of disclosures on PPE are associated with the company’s leverage level. 
 
Foreign Activity 
Few studies included “foreign activity” as a determining factor in the level of disclosure.  According to 
Cooke (1989), Raffournier (1995), and Depoers (2000), companies with an international presence have 
more incentives to manage stakeholders’ perception of their good corporate reputation management skills, 
through the disclosure of more information. Oliveira et al. (2006) studied this variable stating that company 
internationalization increased the levels of disclosure; however, no relationship between the variable 
“foreign activity” and the level of disclosure was found in that same study. Gastón et al. (2010) estimated 
the “foreign activity” through foreign sales and concluded that the effect of IAS/IFRS was less significant in 
companies with a higher proportion of foreign sales over total sales. 
According to the previous studies, it is expected that there is no significant association between the 
FTA level of disclosure and “foreign activity”. Thus, the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
H3) The number of disclosures on PPE are positively associated with the foreign activity of the 
company. 
 
Profitability 
The political costs theory suggests that profitable companies have higher incentives to disclose more 
information, because company profits influence a company’s political visibility (Hibbitt, 2004). However, 
previous studies have shown that the “profitability” does not influence the level of disclosure (Aljifri, 2008; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Morais and Fialho, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2006). In addition, Akhtaruddin (2005) 
noted that there is very little relationship between “profitability” and the level of disclosure. Nevertheless, 
International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences 
Vol. 5 (1), pp. 58–71, © 2015 HRMARS 
    
 62
some authors have confirmed the existence of a positive association between performance and the level of 
disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1992; Salotti and Yamamoto, 2008; Cunha and Ribeiro, 2008). 
Based on previous studies, the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
H4) The number of disclosures on PPE are positively associated with the company’s profitability. 
Age 
Reputation arises from “learning over time through observed behaviour about some exogenous 
characteristic of agents” (Diamond, 1989, p. 829). Therefore, in order to manage their reputation, older 
companies are expected to present higher levels of compliance with disclosure requirements. Akhtaruddin 
(2005) classified the companies into three categories: very old, old, and new. This author did not support 
the hypothesis that older firms provide more information than new firms. 
For this reason, the following research hypothesis has been formulated: 
H5) The number of disclosures on PPE are positively associated with the age of the company. 
 
5. Methodology of research 
5.1 Sample 
The sample included in this study comprises 44 Portuguese non-listed companies selected among the 
ranking of the 500 largest Portuguese companies in 2010 (Exame Magazine, 2010) with annual reports 
available on the Internet. These companies have adopted the SNC for the first time from 2010 onwards. 
Trusts and holding companies were excluded, due to the specific activity they perform and the specific 
regulations of these sectors (Table 2). 
Table 2. Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Dependent variable 
The financial statements of the sample companies for the years 2010-2011 were content analyzed to 
assess the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements established by NCRF 7 (Plant, Property and 
Equipment). Following Morais and Fialho (2008) we constructed a list of 27 items of compliance (Appendix 
1), based on the disclosures required by NCRF 7. The compliance with the disclosure requirements was 
assessed (Akhtanruddin, 2005; Gastón et al., 2010; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Tsalavoutas, 2011): 
 Assumes “1” if the company complies with the disclosure requirement; 
 Assumes “0” if the company does not comply with the disclosure requirement; 
 Assumes “non-applicable” if a certain item of disclosure does not need to be disclosed. 
The dependent variable involves the construction of a disclosure score (DS). The DS is the number of 
disclosures of the company j in each year i, calculated in the following way: 
          (1) 
 
Where: 
Number of relevant disclosure items (excluding items not applicable) for the company  
( ): 
Assumes 1 if the item was disclosed, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Number of companies included in the Exame ranking - 2010 500
Number of companies without annual reports available in the internet 449
Trusts and Holding companies 7
Final sample 44
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5.3 Independent variables 
Table 3 presents a summary of the independent and control variables for each hypothesis and the 
measures used for each variable, as well as the expected sign. 
 
Table 3. Definition and predicted signs for independent and control variables 
 
Variables Proxies
Expected 
Sign
Independent
Company Size Total assets (million euros) +
Total Sales (million euros) +
Number of Employees +
Leverage Debt to equit ratio ( total debt to equity) ?
Foreign Activity Ratio foreign sales to total sales +
Profitability Return on equity ration = income before tax to equity +
Return on assets ratio = income beforre tax to total assets +
Age Number of years the company has been in operation since inception +
Control
Industry Dummy variable = 1 if company belongs to manufacturing, 0 otherwise
Type of Auditor Dummy variable = 1 if auditing firm is a BIG4, 0 otherwise  
 
The variable “company size” was assessed using the variables total assets (TA), total sales (TS), and 
number of employees (NE) (Oliveira et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). These 
size variables were highly correlated. Principal components analysis was applied to generate an index for 
size. Only one component, explaining 62 per cent (2010) and 61 per cent (2011) of the total variance, was 
extracted (Eigenvalue>1). The principal components analysis was validated by the KMO measure of 
sampling adequacy (2010: KMO=0.637; 2011: KMO=0.635) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (2010: F2 = 
21.879 and a p-value <0.01; 2011: F2 = 20.904 and a p-value <0.01). The component extracted represents a 
unique composite index for the j company: 
Size2010 = 0.746 x TA + 0.844 x TS + 0.765 x NE 
Size2011 = 0,697 x TA + 0,829 x TS + 0,809 x NE 
The variable “leverage” was measured by the debt-to-equity ratio (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
The variable “foreign activity” was measured by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Oliveira et al., 
2006). 
The variable “profitability” was measured by the return on equity (ratio income before tax to equity) 
and return on assets (ratio income before tax to total assets) (Oliveira et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a). 
The control variables considered were: “industry” and “type of auditor”. Several authors confirm that 
the industry is an indicator that influences, positively, the level of disclosure (Aljifri, 2008; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006). However, Tsalavoutas (2011) found a 
significant negative association between the industry and the degree of compliance with the disclosures 
required by NCRF 7. Additionally, Gastón et al. (2010) concluded that this variable is not relevant. 
Companies audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms present higher levels of disclosure 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006; Tsalavoutas, 2011). Other authors (Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007; Adelopo, 2011) studied this variable and concluded that the level of disclosure is 
significantly related to the type of auditor and that there is a positive relationship between this variable and 
voluntary disclosure. However, Morais and Fialho (2008) found no relationship between the type of auditor 
and the level of disclosure. 
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The variable “industry” was measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company 
falls within the manufacturing sector and the value 0 otherwise. The selection of the two types of activity 
relates to the fact that we expect manufacturing companies to need more investment in PPE and, thus, 
present higher levels of disclosure (Gastón et al., 2010; Aljifri, 2008). 
The variable “type of auditor” was measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the audit 
firm is one of the Big 4, taking the value 0, otherwise (Oliveira et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a). 
5.3 Estimation Model 
The estimation model will test whether the determinants affect the level of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements proposed by NCRF 7: 
 
DSjj = D0 + E1 Company Syzej+ E2Leveragej+E3Foreign Activityj+ E4Profitabilityj+  +E5Agej+ E6Activityj+ 
E7Profitabilityj+ E8Sector of Activityj+ E9Type of Auditorj+ … + PI     (2) 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4 shows that, from a total of 27 items of disclosure required by NCRF 7, companies on average 
comply with 10.16 items in 2010, and with 9.93 items in 2011. The maximum of disclosures found per 
company, in both years, was 16 items. However, it is interesting to observe that some companies did not 
have to comply with all disclosure requirements. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
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Mensurament N Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Panel A: 2010
Disclosure score Sum 44 8.00 16.00 10.16 2.33
Total assets MEuros 44 9.14 2,284.64 365.50 484.10
Total sales MEuros 44 0.00 1,401.09 155.22 252.46
Number of employees Sum 44 9.00 13,339.00 1,619.32 3,065.01
Leverage Ratio 44 -8.52 5.05 0.05 2.10
Foreign activity Ratio 44 0.00 0.86 0.07 0.20
Return on equity Ratio 44 -1.06 0.68 0.08 0.28
Return on assets Ratio 44 4.00 167.00 43.91 36.04
Age Sum 44 4.00 491.00 54.14 76.42
Panel B: 2011
Disclosures score Sum 44 8.00 16.00 9.93 2.06
Total assets MEuros 44 6.12 2,395.38 358.57 480.00
Total sales MEuros 44 0.00 1,315.05 145.74 236.06
Number of employees Sum 44 11.00 12,468.00 1,442.05 2,746.19
Leverage Ratio 44 -8.14 9.44 0.16 2.38
Foreign activity Ratio 44 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.19
Return on equity Ratio 44 -1.53 1.25 0.04 0.37
Return on assets Ratio 44 -0.50 0.33 -0.01 0.13
Age Sum 44 5.00 168.00 44.91 36.04
Categorical Variables
Industry
6 14%
38 86%
Type of auditor
15 34%
29 66%
Definition of variables: leverage = debt to equity ratio; foreign activity = ratio of foreign sales to total
sales; return on equity = ration of income before tax to equity; return on assests = ratio of income
beforre tax to total assets; age = number of years the company has been in operation since
inception; industry = 1 if company belongs to manufacturing, 0 otherwise; type of auditor = 1 if
auditing firm is a BIG4, 0 otherwise)
          Dummy  = Others
          Dummy  = Manufacturing
          Dummy  = Others
          Dummy  = Big4
 
Table 4 also shows that mean values of the independent variables present higher values in 2010 
when compared to 2011. This can be a consequence of the first time adoption of the new accounting frame 
of reference in 2010. However, the leverage presents a higher level in 2011 when compared to 2010. This is 
a reflection of the lack of liquidity felt by companies, as a consequence of the recent global financial crisis 
and the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal.   
 
Table 5. Differences in the mean values of dependent and independent variables 
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2010 2011
Disclosure score 10.16 9.93 -0.995
Company size 403.67 370.75 -4.376 **
Leverage 0.05 0.16 -0.755
Foreign activity 0.07 0.06 -0.84
Return on equity 0.08 0.04 -1.004
Return on assets 43.91 -0.01 -1.389
Age 54.14 44.91 -6.633 **
Differences statistically significant at: * 0.05, and ** 0.01 levels (two-tailed).
Mean values
Z
Definition of variables: company size = principal components analyisi (total assets,
total sales, number of employees); leverage = debt to equity ratio; foreign activity =
ratio of foreign sales to total sales; return on equity = ration of income before tax to
equity; return on assests = ratio of income beforre tax to total assets; age = number
of years the company has been in operation since inception; industry = 1 if
company belongs to manufacturing, 0 otherwise; type of auditor = 1 if auditing firm
is a BIG4, 0 otherwise)
 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the non-parametric tests of Wilcoxon to assess the differences in the 
mean values of the dependent and independent variables between 2010 and 2011. Findings indicate that 
those differences were not statistically significant. 
 
6.2. Regression testing 
Pearson correlations were determined as presented in Table 6. To test for the existence of 
multicollinearity, we computed variance inflation factors (VIFs). The highest VIF is above 2, suggesting that 
the problem of multicollinearity is minimal. Table 6 (Panel A) shows that in 2010 there is a statistically 
significant correlation (p-value < 0.01) between the disclosure score and the age of the company. In 2011, 
findings indicate a statistically significant correlation between the disclosure score and company size (p-
value < 0.05), and between the disclosure score and the age of the company (p-value <0.01). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regressions, for each year, were used to test the 
interrelationship between the various independent and control variables and the disclosure score. To 
assure the stability of the regression model, the assumptions underlying the regression models were tested 
for autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heterocedasticity, outliers and influential observations, and the 
normality of residuals. White’s heteroscedasticity test was performed on each model for unequal variances, 
and heteroscedasticity was corrected by the White matrix. One influential observation was removed from 
the analysis in both years. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors test suggested that the raw dependent 
variables and the continuous independent variables did not follow a normal distribution. Therefore, before 
running the regression models, dependent variables and continuous independent variables were 
transformed into normal scores using Blom’s transformation (Cooke, 1998). The correlation matrix and the 
regression analysis were performed on the transformed data. 
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Table 6. Bivariate relationships for the independent and control variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Disclosure score 1.000
(2) Company size 0.264 1.000
(3) Leverage 0.095 -0.055 1.000
(4) Foreign activity -0.079 -0.073 0.223 1.000
(5) Return on equity -0.184 0,354 * 0.050 0.069 1.000
(6) Return on assets -0.193 0.120 0.169 0.119 0,576 ** 1.000
(7) Age 0,521 ** 0.277 0.016 0.117 0.001 -0.111 1.000
(8) Industry -0.006 -0.124 -0.040 0.085 0.185 0.265 0.221 1.000
(9) Type of auditor -0.128 0.241 -0.178 -0.235 0.003 0.118 0.092 -0.006 1.000
(1) Disclosure score 1.000
(2) Company size 0,305 * 1.000
(3) Leverage -0.054 -0.078 1.000
(4) Foreign activity -0.055 -0.079 0.223 1.000
(5) Return on equity 0.076 0,380 * -0.250 -0.196 1.000
(6) Return on assets -0.029 0.094 0.136 0.000 0,316 * 1.000
(7) Age 0,564 ** 0.279 -0.034 0.143 0.032 0.016 1.000
(8) Industry 0.141 -0.170 0.003 0.139 -0.183 0.190 0.221 1.000
(9) Type of auditor -0.172 0.233 -0.151 -0.202 0.163 0.143 0.092 -0.006 1.000
Definition of variables: company size = principal components analyisi (total assets, total sales, number of employees);
leverage = debt to equity ratio; foreign activity = ratio of foreign sales to total sales; return on equity = ration of income before
tax to equity; return on assests = ratio of income beforre tax to total assets; age = number of years the company has been in
operation since inception; industry = 1 if company belongs to manufacturing, 0 otherwise; type of auditor = 1 if auditing firm
is a BIG4, 0 otherwise)
Panel A: Year 2010
Panel B: Year 2011
Significant at: * 0.05 level, and ** 0.01 level (two-tailed)
 
 
Table 7 shows that the regression models are statistically significant in both years (p-value < 0.01) for 
the number of disclosures on PPE (2010: R2 adjusted = 0.376; 2011: R2 adjusted = 0.433). The removal of 
outliers improved the previous R2 adjusted (2010: from 0.31 to 0.376; 2011: from 0.324 to 0.433). 
The number of disclosures on PPE, in both years, is associated negatively with foreign activity (p-
value <0.01), and type of auditor (2010: p-value < 0.05; 2011: p-value < 0.01). Hypothesis H3 is not 
supported. Portuguese unlisted companies that present higher degrees of internationalization do not have 
incentives to manage stakeholders’ perception of their good corporate reputation management skills, 
through the disclosure of more information on PPE. Perhaps, other kind of information would be more 
appropriate and selected by managers throughout this process. However, this finding corroborates prior 
literature (Gastón et al., 2010). Authors found that the effect of IAS/IFRS was less significant in companies 
with a higher degree of internationalization. 
Portuguese unlisted companies not audited by the BIG 4 auditing firms’ present higher levels of 
disclosure on PPE. This finding contradicts previous findings (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Oliveira et 
al., 2006; Tsalavoutas, 2011; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Adelopo, 2011). Agency theory suggests that 
companies with high agency costs tend to contract higher quality auditing firms – the BIG 4 international 
auditing firms – to reduce those costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the Portuguese unlisted 
companies have low levels of agency costs. They are mainly family-dominated, with a complex network of 
ownership, and a substantial number of shares owned by one single shareholder (Mota, 2003).  
The number of disclosures on PPE, in both years, is associated positively with the age of the company 
(p-value < 0.01). Hypothesis H5 is supported. Older companies with higher levels of corporate reputation 
disclose more information on PPE to manage stakeholders’ perception of their reputation. 
The number of disclosures on PPE is not associated with company size, leverage, and profitability. 
Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are not supported. These findings were expected due to the highly 
concentrated ownership structures of Portuguese unlisted companies, which reduce agency costs. 
Moreover, the profitability of Portuguese companies has been decreasing since 2007, due to recent global 
financial crisis effects and the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis. 
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Table 7. Results of regression model for number of disclosures 
 
Variables Expected 
sign
Constant 0,161 0,137
Company size + 0,225 0,170
Leverage ? 0,096 -0,031
Foreign activity + -0,433 ** -0,465 **
Return on equity + -0,230 0,071
Return on assets + 0,035 0,000
Age + 0,443 ** 0,480 ***
Sector of activity 0,020 0,373
Type of auditor -0,467 * -0,563 **
Model Fit
F 4,164 ** 5,010 **
R2 0,495 0,541
R2 Adjusted 0,376 0,433
Durbin-Watson 1,927 2,038
Definition of variables: company size = principal components analyisi (total assets,
total sales, number of employees); leverage = debt to equity ratio; foreign activity =
ratio of foreign sales to total sales; return on equity = ration of income before tax to
equity; return on assests = ratio of income beforre tax to total assets; age = number
of years the company has been in operation since inception; industry = 1 if company 
belongs to manufacturing, 0 otherwise; type of auditor = 1 if auditing firm is a BIG4,
0 otherwise)
Disclosure Score 2010 Disclosure Score 2011
Significance at: * 0.05, and ** 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively; dependent and
independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation.
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, when necessary.
 
 
7. Conclusions, limitations and future research 
This study intends to analyze the degree of compliance with the disclosure requirements under NCRF 
7 for the years 2010 and 2011. Portuguese companies presented very interesting levels of compliance with 
the disclosure requirements proposed by NCRF 7, basically because most of the companies did not need to 
comply with all those disclosure requirements.  
Our analysis of PPE disclosures by Portuguese unlisted companies reveals that arguments based on 
the agency theory are not appropriate to understand managers’ disclosure policies, and their level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Findings indicate that older companies with lower 
degrees of internationalization disclose more information on PPE. Through the disclosure of more 
information on PPE, managers try to influence the way stakeholders perceive corporate reputation 
management. This promotes confidence among relevant stakeholders and, consequently, helps guarantee 
a continuous inflow of resources to the company. 
Several limitations should be noted. First, the sample selected is very small. Further research should 
use a larger sample to confirm the expected results. Second, the present study has only considered two 
years after the adoption of the new Portuguese accounting frame of reference – the Portuguese 
Accounting Standardization System (SNC). Further studies should try to assess the effects of the adoption of 
this new accounting frame of reference on the motivations for complying with the disclosure requirements 
on PPE, including in that sample some years previous to SNC adoption. 
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Appendix 1 
Items Companies 
The entity has Property, Plant & Equipment assets? (1 / 0 / NA) 
i. If yes, discloses:  
a) The measurement bases used for determining the gross book value (1 / 0 / NA) 
b) The depreciation methods (1 / 0 / NA) 
c) The useful lives or the depreciation rates (1 / 0 / NA) 
d) The gross book value and the accumulated depreciation (aggregated with accumulated 
impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the period 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
e) A reconciliation of the book value at the beginning and end of the period (1 / 0 / NA) 
f) Depreciation, whether recognized in the income statement or as part of the cost of other assets, 
during a period 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
g) Accumulated depreciation at the end of the period (1 / 0 / NA) 
h) The existence and amounts of ownership restrictions and tangible fixed assets that are pledged 
as security for liabilities 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
i) The amount of expenditures recognized in the book value of an FTA item during its construction (1 / 0 / NA) 
j) The amount of contractual commitments for the acquisition of FTA (1 / 0 / NA) 
k) The amount of compensation from third parties for items of the FTA that were impaired, lost or 
given up that is included in the income statement 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
i. The company adopts the revaluation model and by class of intangible assets discloses:  
a) The effective date of the revaluation (1 / 0 / NA) 
b) If was involved an independent appraiser (1 / 0 / NA) 
c) Indication of fair value determination:  
1. Directly by reference to observable prices in an active market (1 / 0 / NA) 
2. Recent market transactions on a non-relationship basis between the parties (1 / 0 / NA) 
3. The book value of the revaluation surplus, indicating the change for the period and any 
restrictions on the distribution of the balance to shareholders 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
4. Methods and significant assumptions applied in estimating assets fair value (1 / 0 / NA) 
i. Regarding impairment, for each class of assets:  
a) The amount of impairment losses recognized in the period (1 / 0 / NA) 
b) The amount of reversals of impairment losses recognized in the period (1 / 0 / NA) 
c) The amount of impairment losses on revaluated assets recognized in equity in the period (1 / 0 / NA) 
d) The amount of reversals of impairment losses on revaluated assets recognized in equity in the 
period 
(1 / 0 / NA) 
v. As for changes in accounting estimates:  
a) The amount of a change in an accounting estimate (1 / 0 / NA) 
b) If the amount of the estimate is impracticable, disclose that fact (1 / 0 / NA) 
v. As for the existence of non-current assets held for sale:  
a) A description of the non-current asset (1 / 0 / NA) 
b) A description of the facts and circumstances of the sale (1 / 0 / NA) 
 
